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. INTRODUCTION
Human society has createdmany dispute resolutionmechanisms. Among them, court
adjudication is one of the most recognisable and most used mechanisms. For many,
court adjudication and what it entails is a public good. Mainstream scholarship con-
siders goods that are non-rivalrous and non-excludable as public goods. Since adju-
dication is considered a public good, it comes without saying that court adjudication
is considered as non-rivalrous and non-excludable. However, recently court adjudi-
cation has been treated and advertised in a different way, apparently being influenced
by the competition of civil justice systems. Competition of civil justice systems is a
relatively new phenomenon in the EU, where some member states try to “sell” their
court adjudication systems as they sell other goods such as their infrastructure and
natural resources. If the competition of civil justice systems intensifies, it might affect
the way court adjudication as a good is perceived and treated. Starting from here, the
purpose of this paper is to explore what can happen in case the competition of civil
justice systems intensifies, with a particular focus on the European Union (EU).
As mentioned above, adjudication is considered as a public good and therefore as
being non-rivalrous and non-excludable. In case these characteristics are inherent,
i.e. attributes which adjudication has without outside interferences, they cannot be
changed or it would be extremely difficult to change them. In practice, these are
not inherent characteristics of adjudication, but consequences of the stance of the gov-
ernments towards “public goods”. Therefore, in order to change the nature of adju-
dication as a public good, it is not enough to change the non-rivalrous and non-
excludable characteristics, but it is necessary to change the stance of the government.
This paper argues that the competition of civil justice systems can influence the stance
of the governments and therefore change the nature of adjudication.
To serve the general purpose, the first part of the paper attempts to further define and
understand the meaning of good and public good. Mainstream scholarship has an
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objective approach to public goods, considering all non-rivalrous and non-excludable
goods as public goods. To overcome these limits, this paper takes a subjective
approach to consider the nature of goods and public goods. This approach is reflected
in the definition of public good, which allows for more flexibility to its categorisation
andstudy.Taking thispositiondoesnot eliminate thenon-rivalrousandnon-excludable
characteristics of public goods, but considers them as acquired rather than inherent
characteristics.
The second part of the paper discusses the place of court adjudication in relation to
other dispute resolution mechanisms. It is submitted that court adjudication has been
privileged by governments by considering it a public good. This privilege has besto-
wed upon court adjudication its non-rivalrous and non-excludable characteristics.
Court adjudication exercises three functions: conflict resolution, law creation and
legal education. Not all of these functions have the same features. This division is
important because in the competition between civil justice systems, conflict resolution
would be the most attractive and most affected part of the court adjudication
“package”.
The third part of the paper gives a brief description of the competition of civil justice
systems in the EU. Countries such as Germany, France and England have been pro-
moting their judicial system as venues for cross-border litigants in the EU. They create
the supply side of the competition process, while the demand side is created mostly
by companies and lawyers. It is submitted that cross-border litigants are interested
only in the dispute resolution part of the court adjudication, and because of this gov-
ernments consider court adjudication as a private good rather than a public good. It
does not mean that court adjudication will cease to be a public good as long as the
governments will consider it as such, but its non-rivalrous and non-excludable char-
acteristics will be eroded at the expense of common citizens.
. GOODS AND PUBLIC GOODS
In order to answer the research question, it is important to explore the concept of
good and public good. The notion of good1 is somehow axiomatic. Many have a
notion of its meaning, but no definition is widely accepted. In very broad terms, good
means everything that brings a utility to someone. This is contrasted by the notion of
bad2, which is everything that diminishes utility to someone. In this regard, the per-
son-good relationship is subjective and influenced among others by factors such as
1. Good as a noun and not good as an adjective.
2. Some consider bads as negative goods. See: Foldvary, Fred F., ‘Global Public Goods’, Encyclopedia of
Global Justice (2011) 434, 434.
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time, space, emotive situation, wealth, politics and economy. Subjectively, some-
thing can be a good for A, but it can be neither a good nor a bad for B, and furthermore
it can be a bad for C. Moreover, the relation to good is not fixed in time; it might
change rapidly. Something that is a good now can become a bad later.3 To consider
something as a good, the personal relation to the good at a certain point of time should
be taken into account.
In economics, a good is something that brings utility or an economic advantage.Many
goods are vested with property rights while legislation is enacted to protect these
rights and therefore the economic value of the goods.4 It goeswithout saying that soci-
eties try to avoid bad, mitigate its effect or transform bad into good and therefore
maximise benefits. The same subjective approach, as described above, is needed to
assess whether or not something brings an economic advantage and therefore is a
good. Moreover, economists distinguish between goods and services. With this distinc-
tion, goods are tangibles that bring economic utility, while services are intangibles that
bring economic utility.5 Usually, the term good refers to both good and service unless it
is specified that is a service.
Goods can be divided in two categories, public goods6 and private goods. In this bipolar
division, all non-public goods are private goods. Mainstream scholarship defines
non-rivalrous and non-excludable goods as pubic goods.7 Opposite to this, private
goods are subject to rivalry and are excludable. By “non-rivalrous” it is meant that
3. Two examples: First, the case of aspirin which can be a good for a person in a particular medical con-
dition, but it can become a bad if the dosage is exceeded; on the other hand, the same aspirin is neither a
good nor a bad to a healthy person. At this point ownership is excluded. In case of ownership, the relation
between the aspirin and the person changes again and therefore the person considers the aspirin as a
good. In this example, aspirin is both good and bad for the same person but in different conditions. As a
second example, consider a rainy day. Farmer A who has his lands uphill which are well drained ben-
efits from rain and considers it a good, while farmer B with lands downhill which are not well drained
suffers from inundation and considers rain a bad; far away, an observer looking the rain and not affected
by it considers rain neither a good nor a bad. In this example, rain at the same time is considered both a
good and a bad by different persons, based on their personal experience with it.
4. Rubin, Paul, ‘Public Goods and the Evolution of Altruism: The Case of the Law’ (2008) 8 Politics and Life
Sciences 26, 28.
5. A perfume is a good as it can be touched and used, while a haircut is to be considered a service even
though the change of hairstyle or length can be touched and felt.
6. Public goods on their own can be divided into goods, services and resources. Sometimes, these three are
called collective goods. See: Foldvary 2011, p. 434.
7. For definition of public good, please see: Van Aaken, Anne, ‘Trust, verify, or Incentivize? Effectuating
Public Law Regulating Public Goods Through Market Mechanism’ (2010) Proceedings of the Annual
Meeting (American Society of International Law) 153; Lemieux, Pierre, ‘Producing Private Goods Pri-
vately’ (2012) 35.3 Regulation 8; Rubin 2008, p. 26; Bratspies, Rebecca, ‘Global Public Goods: An Intro-
duction’ (2010) Proceedings of the 104th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law
147; Foldvary 2011, p. 434; Kaul, Inge, ‘Global Public Goods’, The Princeton Encyclopedia of the World
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the consumption of such goods does not diminish the quantity and the quality of the
same good for other people. By “non-excludable” it is meant that it is impossible to
limit the consumption of such goods and their availability.8 This approach suggests
that non-rivalrous and non-excludable are inherent characteristics of some goods
and these goods are called public goods. This definition and categorisation creates
some problems because it is difficult to define and agree on the consumption quan-
tity (or quality) needed to meet the criteria of the definition. In some cases, just a
small consumption of public goods can lead to scarcity for the rest of the popula-
tion.9 Furthermore, in a finite world, it is very difficult to have unlimited resources
that can give the possibility to everyone to use them at their will. A simple inven-
tory would indicate that not all public goods have both the characteristics of the def-
inition. Some public goods have only one of the characteristics, for example,
non-rivalrous and excludable goods are called club goods10, while rivalrous and
non-excludable goods are called common pool sources. These kind of goods bear sim-
ilarities with both private goods and public goods. However, while some of them are
public goods others are private goods. If public goods are not strictly related to the
non-rivalrous and non-excludable qualities, what is a public good? How could one
define it?
As said before, the relation to goods is subjective. As regards public goods, non-rival-
rous and non-excludable are not inherent characteristics of public goods, it is the gov-
ernment that decides to “label” something as a public good. Governments consider
various goods as public goods, because they play an important role in society. As
a consequence, the government obliges everyone within its jurisdiction or related
to that government to consider that good a public good. Furthermore, the government
tries to endow to this good the non-rivalrous and non-excludable characteristics.
Given the non-excludable characteristics of public goods, it is difficult to exclude
free-riders. This means that there are always persons who enjoy the utility of public
Economy (2009) 550; SimonMarginson ‘Higher Education and public good’ <www.cshe.unimelb.edu.
au/people/marginson_docs/BERA_London_6September2011.pdf> accessed 26 August 2015.
8. For some authors, non-excludability is not a necessary element for public goods. See: Foldvary 2011,
p. 434.
9. Tiebout claims that there are many public goods which decrease in availability and quality if they are
consumed bymany other consumers. Examples of this are public schools or highways. He suggests that
a public good is one which should be produced, but for which there is no feasible method of charging the
consumers. This definition is given as a response to the concept of consumption in definitions similar to
themainstream one. See: Tiebout, Charles, ‘APure Theory of Local Expenditures’ (1956) 64/5 Journal of
Political Economy 416, 417.
10. For more see: Bodansky, Daniel, ‘What’s in a Concept? Public Goods, International Law and Legiti-
macy’ (2012) 23 The European Journal of International Law 651; Foldvary 2011, p. 434; Van Aaken
2010, p. 153.
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goods, but do not contribute to their costs. Some authors11 consider national
defence, the sun or air as good examples of this.12 In case someone does not pay
taxes, he still enjoys the national defence of that country. This means that he is taking
a “free ride”. Because of this characteristic, public goods tend to be under produced,
and as a consequence, they tend to be financed by governments by coercively collec-
ting taxes.13 The production of public goods faces two other challenges, market fail-
ure and government failure.14 That is why their production needs collective and
cooperative action and, while the costs are concentrated to the producer, the benefits
are diffused to many.15 This is important because court adjudication is considered to
be a public good, but as it was shown the label “public good” is in the hands of the
governments. Influential factors like the competition of civil justice systems might
change the attitude of governments.
As a conclusion, it is submitted that when defining something as a public good the
characteristics of the good itself do not play a role. The most important thing is the
opinion of the government. If the government considers a good a public good, every-
one should follow suit. Non-rivalrous and non-excludable are two desired character-
istics that governments try to endow to public goods because of their merits in social,
political and economic spheres.16 One of these public goods is court adjudication. The
next section describes the position of court adjudication in relation to other dispute
resolution mechanisms and the reason why the government considers court adjudi-
cation as a public good.
11. Rubin 2008, p. 26; Lemieux 2012, p. 8.
12. Public goods tend to be very abstract. As a concept, it can include general and wide concepts such as:
social cohesion, social cooperation, nature, atmosphere, the Moon, knowledge, etc.
13. Lemieux 2012, p. 9.
14. Kaul 2009, p. 552.
15. The production of public goods faces difficulties even when the benefits outweighs the costs. See: Brat-
spies 2010, p. 147.
16. Common goods are another example of goods that are not defined by their characteristics, but by the sub-
jective stance of the government. Common goods refer to everything that benefits all members of a com-
munity. For example, when governments save or give incentives to some private companies (private
goods), they do it because they consider them so important that they are labelled as common goods.
For more see: Moltchanova, Anna, ‘Common good’, Encyclopedia of Global Justice (2011) 165. An
example of goods that are defined strictly as a result of their characteristics are credence goods. Credence
goods are those that are provided by an expert who also determines the buyer’s needs. Buyers of these
kinds of goods cannot assess howmuch of these goods they need, cannot assess how good the good is or
even whether or not it exists. Markets of this kind of goods are characterised by fraud and prices not
corresponding to costs. For more see: Hadfield, Gillian K., ‘The Price of Law: How the Market for Law-
yers Distorts the Justice System’ (1999-2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 953, 968, which illustrates the
concept with the market for lawyers.
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. COURT ADJUDICATION AND ITS NATURE
1.3.1 Court Adjudication: Definition and Elements
Court adjudication is a mechanism used to resolve conflicts that otherwise might
result in fractures and troubles for individuals and the society. It has been argued that
court adjudication’s purpose is to find the truth, to bring social harmony or to protect
social values.17
Different definitions have beenused for court adjudication during the last century. The
termwas initiallyused inbankruptcyproceedings, to refer to the finaldeclarationof the
debtor to be bankrupt.18 Dexter refers to court adjudication as “the application of gen-
eral principles to concrete instances by recognised authorities, with the purpose and
probable result of determining what shall happen to specified persons, property, or
institutions.”19 This definition is important because it is created by a sociologist and
therefore departs from the legal stand point. It puts court adjudication in the position
of a mechanism created by the society to resolve disputes and not in the position of a
legal mechanism. Moreover, a sociological standpoint offers the insights of the social
control theory where adjudication plays an important role.20 This definition contains
someelements that are important to the functioningof court adjudication.21 First, court
adjudication functions based on general principles that are applied to specific situa-
tions. “General principles” is an umbrella term that includes laws, court decisions or
opinions, social norms or other sources of law recognised in a jurisdiction. These prin-
ciples regulate the general behaviour in society and are recognised and accepted by the
parties before the dispute arises. Second, a recognised authority must exist. This
authority is representedby the judgeand is organisedby the statemaking ituniversally
recognisable. Inmany cases, conflictingparties donot need to assignor accept the juris-
diction of this authority before the conflict arises. Third, court adjudication determines
17. Weckstein, Donald, ‘The Purposes of Dispute Resolution: Comparative Concepts of Justice’ (1988) 26
American Business Law Journal 605, 606-615.
18. See the voice ‘Adjudication’ in Henry Campbell Black, ‘Law Dictionary: Containing Definitions of the
Terms and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern (West Publishing Co.
1891 St. Paul, MN).
19. Dexter, Lewis A., ‘The Sociology of Adjudication: Who Defines Mental Deficiency’ (1960) 4 American
Behavioral Scientist 13, 13.
20. This is important in view of the discussion in 1.3.2 where the privileged position of the court adjudica-
tion in the eyes of the government is discussed.
21. Another definition of court adjudication is “a procedure for determining a dispute involving a claim of
legal or customary right in which a third party is invested with the authority to make a decision that is
recognized as binding, except that under some systems of adjudication that parties have the right to
reach a different disposition by contract after an adjudication”.
For the definition and the elements it contains see: Hazard Jr., Geoffrey C., ‘Adjudication as a Private
Good: A Comment’ (1979) 8 The Journal of Legal Studies 319.
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what shall happen to specified persons, property, or institutions. This element is the
decision of the court which tries to quell the dispute between the parties.
Some elements of court adjudication are missing from this definition. First, this def-
inition does not provide for any mechanism that would allow the enforcement of
court decisions, despite the fact that one of the reasons why court adjudication is used
is to give the possibility to use coercive force to enforce the decision. It can be argued
that the recognised authority that decides upon the dispute is the same person inves-
ted with coercive power to enforce this decision. This is not always true. In countries
where power is allocated to different branches, coercive power is applied by the exec-
utive branch and not by the judiciary. Court adjudication offers only a binding deci-
sion; its enforcement is left in the hands of other authorities. Second, an element that
should be added is rationality. The decision-making process is based on a rational
consideration of facts and regulations related to the case. Without rationality it would
be enough to toss a coin and decide based on the result; after all, the coin is impartial
and cheap. Adjudication is not a desultory process and cannot be decided by tossing a
coin. It should give the participants the possibility to influence the discussion by pre-
senting proofs and exposing arguments in their favour.22 This is the third missing ele-
ment, i.e. the possibility to be represented and to present proofs and arguments.
After collecting the elements from above, in this paper court adjudication will have
the following meaning: A rational process between two or more parties where a con-
crete state instance uses logic to apply general principles and regulations; provides the
parties with the possibility to be represented and to present proofs and arguments;
and decides what shall happen to specific persons, property or institutions in order
for coercive power to be used by a competent authority.
Some authors have distinguished the following functions of court adjudication: a dis-
pute resolution function, a rule creating function and a clarification of existing laws
(education) function.23 This set of functions, resulting from a law and economics per-
spective, are considered not just functions but goods as well. Other perspectives
might be different, but still contain the conflict resolution element.24 It is evident that
22. Fuller, Lon L., ‘Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator’ (1963) Wisconsin Law Review 3, 19.
23. In this paper, these functions will be used. For more see: Landes, William and Posner, Richard, ‘Adju-
dication as a Private Good’ (1979) 8 The Journal of Legal Studies 235, 236; Wagner, Gerhard, ‘Dispute
Resolution as a Product: Competition between Civil Justice Systems’ in Horst Eidenmüller (ed.), ‘Reg-
ulatory Competition in Contract law and Dispute Resolution’ (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos 2013 Munich,
Oxford, Baden-Baden) 353, 353.
24. A philosophical set of functions for the courts is:Resolving specific conflicts between individuals or groups
in a manner, which may have some chance of being acceptable even to the loser; serving as a social controller on
behalf of the regime; serving as an extension of the administration, performing a variety of administrative
tasks not involving inter-personal/group conflict. See: Tate, C. Neal andHaynie, Stacia L., ‘Authoritarianism
and the Functions of the Courts: A Time Series Analysis of the Philippine Supreme Court 1961-1987’
(1993) 37 Law & Society Review 707, 713.
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resolving conflicts is the most important function and result of court adjudication.
Without this function, court adjudicationwould not be adjudication. The rule creating
function is accepted in common law countries and it is becoming significant for other
legal traditions as well. The function of clarifying the existing law has a double pur-
pose: the first is to clarify the law for users; the second is to help the development of
legal sciences in general. Clarifying the law helps users to apply the laws better and
allows courts and the adjudication system in general to proclaim a certain way of
deciding. The knowledge that judges adjudicate in a certain way enables the volume
of adjudication to be contained.25 This happens because parties know in advance how
the judgewill decide in certain cases and therefore do not go to court for those cases or
change their behaviour in such a way that they do not end up in court. This function
has a social control effect as well.
1.3.2 Position of Court Adjudication among Other Conflict Resolution Mechanisms:
A Privileged Position
This section shows that court adjudication is one of the dispute mechanism that soci-
eties have. While this mechanism is important for governments, a society without
court adjudication is still possible and functional.
Resolving conflicts is doneprimarily by fightingor talking. Fighting involves theuse of
violence to ascertain one’s opinion. Fighting and the use of violence challenge the
monopoly of power of the (ruling class) government and might become very costly.
To restrict fighting and violence, governments apply sanctions to perpetrators of such
acts and criminalise their behaviour. Despite restrictions and the criminal character of
fighting, there aremany instances where fighting is used to resolve conflicts. “Bullies”
in schools create and resolve conflicts byusingviolenceor threat of violence. Illicit busi-
nesses create conflicts that are resolved by violent acts. So even though fighting is not
recognised as a conflict resolutionmechanismby the state, it is still present in society.26
The other main approach to resolve conflicts is by talking. This implies the use of
verbal or written communication and dialogue between rival parties in a conflict.
25. For the contribution to science, see: Wagner 2013; Freeman, Michael, ‘Lloyd’s introduction to Jurispru-
dence’ (Sweet & Maxwell 2008 London).
26. According to Weckstein, different types of societies have different objectives as regards conflict resolu-
tion. He makes the distinction between societies that put the individual in the center of the conflict and
societies that put the welfare of the society in the center of the conflict. The first one tries to understand
whether or not the rights of the individual have been violated and takes measures to mitigate them.
The second one tries to safeguard the interest of society in general, which is sometime different from
the interest of the individual. Modern societies resemblemore the first type, while ancient and primitive
other resemble the second type. Even in modern societies, there are different groups that resemble the
second type of societies and that put the interest of the group before individual interests. They have
their own mechanisms of dispute resolution. This section considers only the first type of societies.
See: Weckstein 1988, p. 605.
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By talking, conflicts are resolved through bilateral consultation between the parties in
conflict, or with the intervention of a third party. Bilateral consultation includes con-
flict resolution methods like negotiation and reconciliation. In case a third party is
involved, the dispute resolution process develops into mediation, arbitration or court
adjudication (litigation). In the following paragraphs, the different forms of conflict
resolution by talking are discussed.
Reconciliation as a dispute resolution mechanism27 was diffused in ancient and prim-
itive societies. Through reconciliation, parties tried to find a common language to over-
come the conflict before it escalated. Reconciliation presupposes the existence of a
situation before the conflict (where the parties were in amicable or not so diverging
paths) that can be restored. Without this situation and this possibility, reconciliation
cannot exist.28 Going back to the pre-conflict situation was beneficial to the parties
and to society because additional costs and further social conflicts were avoided.29
For the same reasons, reconciliation is appreciated in modern societies.30 Despite the
lack of a universally accepted definition, some elements of reconciliation can be
highlighted: unforced willingness of the parties to admit their responsibility and fault
to the other party, self-confession, apology and absolution.31 Reconciliation differs from
other conflict resolution mechanisms, as it tries to end animosities between parties and
to restore a normal relation between them. In this sense, it is different from other forms
of conflict resolution, which are interested in finding a perpetrator for the wrongful act
and make that person pay or respond according to the rules.32
Negotiation is another form of conflict resolution which does not require the involve-
ment of a third party. Through this process, parties establish a dialogue to overcome
the dispute. This dialogue can terminate in four different ways: 1. no agreement; 2.
victory for one party; 3. simple compromise; 4. a win-win in which parties achieve
a higher joint benefit than would be possible with a compromise agreement.33 The
outcome of a negotiation process would depend on the limits and goals of the parties.
If limits and goals are unreasonable, the outcome would be a non-agreement.
27. Bar-Tal (2000) considers reconciliation not as a conflict resolution but as an alternative to it. See: Bar-Tal,
Daniel, ‘From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analy-
sis’ (2000) 21 Political Psychology 351.
28. Kingsolver, Ann E., ‘Everyday Reconciliation’ (2013) 115 American Anthropologist 663.
29. Joyner, Christopher C., ‘Reconciliation as Conflict Resolution’ (2010) 8 New Zealand Journal of Public
and International Law 39, 43.
30. The General Assembly of the United Nations proclaimed 2009 as the International Year of Reconcilia-
tion. International Year of Reconciliation, 2009 GA Res 61/17, A/RES/61/17 (2007).
31. Joyner 2010, pp. 39, 42.
32. Reconciliation is also called “restorative justice”; while the other forms of conflict resolution are called
“retributive justice”.
33. Carnavale, Peter J. and Pruitt, Dean G., ‘Negotiation and Mediation’ (1992) 43 Annual Review of Psy-
chology 531, 535–550.
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Mediation is a method of conflict resolution that requires the assistance of a third
party to resolve the conflict between two other parties.34 Scholarship suggests that
when parties are in conflict about certain goals but share some others, mediation
increases the chances of success in overcoming difficulties.35 Due to its form, it is used
by parties that want to continue their relationship after the resolution of the dispute.
During mediation, the dispute and its resolution are treated as private goods which
exclude everyone not involved in it.
Anothermethod of resolving conflicts is arbitration. Arbitration is a processwhere the
parties in conflict agree to appoint one or more persons to evaluate upon their claims
over a dispute. The decision delivered through this process can be executed and enfor-
ced inmany jurisdictions. TheNewYork Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards has been accepted by the majority of UN member
states since its adoption in 1959.36 This shows that arbitration is considered as a reli-
able and effective source of conflict resolution. Negotiation, mediation and arbitration
allow the parties greater control over the procedures and the identity of the decision
makers compared to court adjudication.37 Disputes in arbitration proceedings are
considered private goods. Even when one of the parties in the arbitration proceeding
is a national government, it is not allowed to disclose details from the proceeding. The
public interest in dispute is considered as a private good by the government and treated
as such in the arbitration proceeding. It could be said that everything that enters arbi-
tration becomes private.
Court adjudication, on the other hand, has been a mechanism of conflict resolution
since early in human history. Compared with other conflict resolution mechanisms,
court adjudication is not very different. However, court adjudication’s characteristics
(as defined above) make it appropriate to resolve a great variety of conflicts, including
criminal conflicts. People are familiar with it and can recognise it throughout the
world. These characteristics made governments recognise the importance of court
adjudication and consider it as a public good.38 The reasons why governments chose
court adjudication as their default conflict resolution system can be traced to some
circumstances: first, during the evolution of the state, governments wanted to have
34. The involvement of a third party might facilitate asymmetric concessions that parties cannot achieve
through a bilateral dialogue. In bilateral negotiations, parties make more symmetrical concessions to
each other. See: Beardsley, Kyle and Nigel Lo, ‘Third-Party Conflict Management and the Willingness
to Make Concessions’ (2014) 58(2) Journal of Conflict Resolution 363.
35. Weckstein 1988, p. 605; Beardsley and Lo 2014, p. 363.
36. The text of the Convention and some useful links can be found at the website of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL): <www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_-
texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html> accessed 26 August 2015.
37. Weckstein 1988, p. 605.
38. The definition of court adjudication does not give any clue whether or not it is a public good or a private
good.
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some reliable conflict resolution mechanism, which they found in court adjudica-
tion39; second, the elements and functionsof court adjudicationoffermanyadvantages
for governments; third, court adjudication is effective for many types of conflicts,
including criminal conflicts.
1.3.3 Conflicts, from Private Good to Public Goods and Adjudication Provided by
Private Parties
Conflicts revolve around either a public or a private good. The conflict that arises does
not follow the nature of the good necessarily. Some conflicts involve a public good,
but are considered a private good. For example, many conflicts between governments
and private companies involving public goods are resolved by arbitration tribunals.40
Those conflicts are treated as private goods by the parties interested and the tribunal,
even though the character of the good is different.41 Other conflicts involve private
goods, but are considered public goods. The reason why these conflicts are public
goods is that governments consider them important for the cohesion and tranquillity
of the society. In order to filter between the multitude of cases, governments and
courts use material and procedural law. If a claim passes the procedural filters and
is accepted by the court to be judged, the conflict becomes a public good. Conflicts
accepted by the court take the non-rivalrous and non-excludable characteristics of
public goods as well. The non-rivalrous character is manifested in the fact that these
cases do not have consumption problems. The public can be present at their hearings
and attend every phase of dispute resolution. Theoretically, nomatter howmany cases
a court has, it will always deliver the same quality of justice. In other words, the use or
disuse of the court will not create problems to consumers. The non-excludable charac-
teristic is manifested in the fact that the outcomes of these cases do not exclude
anyone.42
After the end of the World War II, many researchers were trying to show that private
parties can take over the role of the state in providing services and goods. In 1979,
Landes and Posner published a paper where they examined the possibility of private
court adjudication from an economic stand point.43 Their paper starts with the pre-
sumption that the court system produces two goods. One is dispute resolution and
the other one is rule creation. These two goods can be, and often are, produced
39. D’Amico (2010) gives an historical example of how court adjudication for criminal offences went from
being private to being public. See: D’Amico, Daniel J., ‘The Prison in Economics: Private and Public
Incarceration in Ancient Greece’ (2010) 145 Public Choice 461.
40. Landes and Posner 1979, pp. 235, 245.
41. Furthermore, the stance of the government towards the good does not change. The good remains a pub-
lic good, but the conflict is still a private one.
42. The law creation function and the education function are shared with the whole society, while the dis-
pute over the good is solved between the parties in conflict.
43. Landes and Posner 1979, p. 235.
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separately. Precedents play an important rule creation role in the Anglo-American
legal system, but they are less important in other countries, while dispute resolution
is universally accepted as the most important function of the courts system.
In case court adjudication is privatised, public intervention would be necessary in
two cases: first, to ensure compliance with the decision of the private judge; and
second, to compel submission to adjudication. In this private system, parties
would have the right to choose the judge they think is the most appropriate.
The rule creation function would face two problems: first, it would be difficult
to establish property rights44 over a precedent and as a consequence judges would
have little incentive to produce it; second, precedents of different judges might be
inconsistent with each other and thus diminish or destroy their value. For these
reasons, Landes and Posner conclude that it would be more likely to see the emer-
gence of a private market for the dispute resolution function than for the rule cre-
ation function. This problem would invite the intervention of the public sector in
this private market.
In the end, the authors conclude that private courts have limitations for both dispute
resolution and rule creation. The authors have an objective view on goods and eval-
uate them based on their characteristics and not based on the subjective consider-
ations. Critics to Landes and Posner have underlined that they fail to show how
a private party would be compelled to submit to adjudication.45 The authors give
some hints on how to resolve this situation, but the assistance of a third party
remains the only feasible alternative. This third party would have to review the case,
at least as regards the right to submit to adjudication.46 Two situations can emerge
here. First, in case this authority is public, the process of privatisation of the court
system would not be finished and the production of dispute resolutions would be, at
least partly, a public affair,47 while the final good will be considered as such by the
government. Second, in case this compelling authority would be private,48 it will
suffer from monopoly problems and it might evolve into a public authority.49
44. Property rights on precedents would allow judges to extract rent from the precedents they created in
case they are used by other judges. In a certain way, a precedent can be viewed as a work of art, for
which the judge needs its copyrights, and relative royalties.
45. Hazard 1979, p. 319.
46. If this third party does not make such a review, its role would be stained by abuses.
47. Carrington, Paul D., ‘Adjudication as a Private Good: A comment’ (1979) 8 The Journal of Legal Studies
303, 303.
48. The question as how and who to appoint such third party remains.
49. On the one hand, there is the example given by D’Amico, which describes how adjudication in Ancient
Athens developed from privately owned to public owned. See: D’Amico 2010, p. 461.
On the other hand, Cowen and Friedman discuss the feasibility of an anarcho-capitalist society to build
stable private institutions. Cowen concludes that these institutionswould evolve into governments. See:
Cowen, Tyler, ‘Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy’ (1992) 8 Economics and Philosophy
249; Friedman, David, ‘Law as a Private Good: A response to Tyler Cowen on the Economics of
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Furthermore, Landes and Posner do not have a definition for adjucation. Therefore
they fail to recognise the element of “binding” in adjudication.50 If a private party
can decide on a dispute but cannot make this decision binding, then it is not
adjudication.51
In their paper, the authors claim that the state behaves like a common seller in the
market for dispute resolutions and tries to sell as much as possible. In my view the
contrary is true; the state tries to make the parties resolve their conflicts away from
courts and use courts only as a last resource and only if the conflict is a public good.
In a certain way, state courts are interested more in the protection of public interest
than in the interest of a particular party.
As regards rule creation, the authors fail to recognise some aspects of it. First, not all
the parties to the adjudication are interested in it.52 For this reason, it is only the state
that is interested in creating rules from adjudication and therefore this is always a
public good. Another negative aspect of rule creation in the hands of privates is
related to democracy. How can a rule created by a private judge for two private
parties be applied to the public in general? Is this contrary to the democratic principle
of division of power? Should the rule creation be a prerogative of a publicly elected
body? These are some of the dilemmas that should be dealt with in case the creation of
rules by privates is considered.
As a conclusion, governments decide which conflict should be resolved by the
courts. This transforms private conflicts into public conflicts that can be resolved
by courts. Furthermore, the majority of the parties are interested in resolving the
conflict and only in rare cases in the other functions of court adjudication. If a gov-
ernment would try to privatise court adjudication, they will partially fail since court
adjudication will need public presence in furthering its functions.
Anarchy’ (1994) 10 Economics and Philosophy 319; Friedman, David, ‘The Machinery of Freedom,
Guide to a Radical Capitalism’ (2nd Edition La Salle, Open Court 1989 IL)
See also: Stringham, Edward, ‘Overlapping Jurisdictions, Proprietary Communities, and Competition
in the Realm of Law’ (2006) 162(3) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift
für diegesamte Staatswissenschaft 516; Caplan, Bryan and Stringham, Edward, ‘Privatizing the Adju-
dication of Disputes’ (2008) 9 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 503.
50. Hazard 1979, p. 319.
51. The authors explain organisational aspects of the private court system, but they do not explain how
these decisions would be binding. If the arbitration example would be used, it would need the help
of a public authority to make the recognition of the decision. Private bailiffs can be used to avoid using
a public authority, but private bailiffs might create even larger conflicts with powerful parties that do
not accept the decision of the court.
52. Carrington 1979, p. 303.
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. COMPET IT ION FOR ADJUDICATIONS IN THE EU
1.4.1 Competing Countries
In recent years, Germany, France and England have been actively promoting their
jurisdictions as venues for adjudication proceedings. The impression is that these
countries are competing to attract litigations. So far competition has evolved in a
“war of brochures”.53
In Germany, several associations with the help of the Ministry of Justice have formed
an alliance to promote German law and institutions. So far, they published a brochure
that explains the benefits of German courts and the efficiency of German law and
institutions, with the clear intention to attract parties in their jurisdictions.54 Similar
to the Germanmove, France has created a Foundation for the promotion of French law
in general and continental law in particular.55 The aim of the Foundation is the promo-
tion of the continental law system vis-à-vis the common law system from a purely aca-
demic stand point. However, a second aim for the existence of the Foundation can be
discerned. This second aim has to do with the desire of France and other European
continental countries to take part in the British share of the legal market. In England
andWales, the Law Society, with the help of the Ministry of Justice, has been promot-
ing English law as amechanism for dispute resolution. Part of the ongoing promotion
was the publication of a brochure56 that promoted, among other things, English
courts as flexible, efficient and reliable.
These might seem to be indicia rather than proofs for the competition of civil justice
systems, but the attention of the government to this process is increasing for some
reasons. One of the reasons why these countries compete is because they believe they
canmake some profit from the fees parties pay to the court. This is not completely true
since many courts are subsidised by their governments and therefore are not a source
of profit. Another reason for competing can be the revenues that an increased number
of cases can bring to the local legal practitioners community. The higher the number of
cases themorework for lawyers and other related professions. This is a rather indirect
revenue for the government in form of taxes extracted from lawyers, but a better source
compared to the direct one. Its importance in the general economic framework is
debatable, since the revenues extracted from lawyers might be too small for a
53. Vogenauer, Stefan, ‘Regulatory Competition through Choice of Contract Law and Choice of Forum in
Europe: Theory and Evidence’ (2013) European Review of Private Law 13.
54. This initiative is called “Law Made in Germany”. For more, see the website: <www.lawmadeinger-
many.de> accessed 26 August 2015.
55. The Foundation is called Fondation pour le Droit Continental. Formore, see link to thewebsite of the Foun-
dation: <www.fondation-droitcontinental.org/en/> accessed 26 August 2015.
56. The brochure is titled “England andWales: The jurisdiction of choice”. It was not possible to find the bro-
chure on the website of the Law society. However, the brochure can be downloaded from this website:
<www.haitz-rechtsanwaelte.de/de/newsarchiv/data/newsarchiv_56_2.pdf> accessed 26August 2015.
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government to bother with the competition. Nevertheless, in the times of economic dis-
tress, no source of revenues can be neglected by the government. In the EU context, it
can be argued that competing countries are too big for the competition of civil justice
systems to be lucrative to them.57 But, it is also true that lawyers are a powerful interest
group in some of these nations and are pushing these governments to enter the com-
petition “game”.58 In a more strategic and long-term view, governments would be
interested in having a competitive court that is attractive to investors and guarantees
a good investment climate. In the long-term, this would be beneficial for the govern-
ment and the economy of that jurisdiction in general. However, the real reasons are
not clear and can be very well a combination of all the above-mentioned reasons.
All these reasons, combined with the general will of the EU to enhance cross border
transactions, free movements of goods and services and the abolition of barriers points
at an increasing interest fromMember States of the EU at competing with each other in
attracting litigants and legal businesses in their jurisdictions.
1.4.2 Aspects of Competition and the Influence to the Nature of Adjudication
The EU is facilitating competition by abolishing barriers and enhancing cross border
trade and cooperation. This has increased the number of transactions over the years
and therefore the number of conflicts arising from these transactions. To facilitate
cross-border conflict resolution, the EU has enforced among others, the Brussels I Reg-
ulation59, which delineates jurisdictional rules in case of cross-border disputes.
These regulations allow parties to choose the court where the conflict will be resolved
after it has arisen. Furthermore, parties can use their party autonomy to stipulate in
contracts, which court will have jurisdiction over their future disputes. Parties have
different criteria to choose a court before and after the conflict has arisen. If a party
knows that it will be a plaintiff, that party will choose a jurisdiction that will be favou-
rable to their position. In the case the parties do not know their position in the future,
they will be inclined to choose a jurisdiction that is perceived as neutral and impartial
57. In the literature about the competition for incorporation, some authors argue that large states do not find
competitions for incorporation attractive. This happens because the revenues derived from this compe-
titions are dwarfed by revenues from other sources. In this situation, large states remain inactive and do
not participate in competition. On the contrary, for small states the revenues derived from the compe-
tition for incorporations are large enough to be lucrative for their budgets. As an example, the revenues
derived from attracting firms to incorporate are important in Delaware, but would be negligible for Cal-
ifornia. For statistics and a theoretical approach to this, see: Bebchuk, Lucian, Alma Cohen and Allen
Ferrell, ‘Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?’ (2002) 90(6) California Law
Review 1775.
58. The cases of the German and British brochures are a typical example.
59. Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L
351, 20.12.2012, pp. 1-32.
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to both parties. The exact reasons and their value to the parties is not yet extensively
researched.60 Governments are interested in attracting as many parties as possible,
therefore they would try to look as neutral as possible, not to scare away any potential
party.61 Taking into account some of the reasons mentioned in Section 1.4.1, countries
would be more attractive if their jurisdiction was perceived as neutral rather than as
favouring the defendant or the plaintiff. It should be clear that governments would be
more interested to attract companies that could bring more lucrative cases and not
individuals who have simple and unprofitable cases. Furthermore, individuals are
less mobile and less inclined to choose a court other than the court of their jurisdiction.
The Brussels I Regulation regulates exactly this aspect by giving to vulnerable parties,
in many cases individuals, the privilege to litigate in their jurisdictions or even be able
to choose a jurisdiction that is favourable to them.
In the market for court adjudication, litigant parties form the demand side. Countries,
which compete to attract litigations in their courts, form the supply side. The good in
this market is court adjudication. In theory, to win a competition race the adjudication
mechanism of a state should excel institutionally and legislatively. Institutionally
means that courts should be more effective, cheaper and faster than rivals. To show
differences between courts, the EU is already assessing the performance of the judicial
systems in its Member States.62 Furthermore, laws and procedures should be attrac-
tive for parties by showing impartiality, stability and a good historical record. The
competitive race is hampered by the characteristics of legal services as a good,63 by
the psychology of choice-making process64 and more often by political implications.
60. Analysing an empirical research, Durand-Barthez suggests that lawyers are psychologically influenced
by the perceived independence of courts, familiarity with the law, and stability of legislation and insti-
tutions. See: Durand-Barthez, Pascal, ‘The “governing law” Clause: Legal and Economic Consequences
of theChoice of Law in International Contracts’ (2012) (5) International Business Law Journal –Revue de
Droit des Affaires Internationales 505, 510. In another analysis, Vogenauer suggests that indeed famil-
iarity with the systems and perceived sophistication of the system are important factors for the choice of
court by the lawyers. See: Vogenauer 2013, pp. 13, 77.
61. Wagner analyses the different type of demand for dispute resolution and different supply in offer. The
interaction between supply and demand would create different with different focuses, e.g., favouring
the plaintiff or favouring a more neutral approach. In my opinion, neutrality is more important because
apart from attracting parties, improves the reputation of the jurisdiction. Wagner 2013.
62. In 2014, the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice published the 5th edition of the
Evaluation of European Judicial Systems. See: <www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/
default_en.asp> accessed 26 August 2015.
63. Hadfield 1999-2000, p. 953.
64. As regards psychology of choice making in law, see: Durand-Barthez 2012, p. 505; Low, Gary, ‘A Psy-
chology of Choice of Laws’ (2013) 24(3) European Business Law Review; Posner, Eric A., ‘The Question-
able Basis of the Common European Sales Law: The Role of an Optional Instrument in Jurisdictional
Competition’ (2013) 50(1) Common Market Law Review 261. On the theory of choice in general, see:
Salecl, Renata, ‘Self in Times of Tyranny of Choice’ (2010) 48(50) FKW//Zeitschrift für Geschlechterfor-
schung und visuelle Kultur; Salecl, Renata, ‘Society of choice’ (2009) 20(1) Differences 157; Schwartz,
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As a good in the market, adjudication should be treated by separating its functions of
dispute resolution, rule creation and clarification of existing laws (education). As said,
all these functions are public goods. It is predicted that the parties in conflict will be
interested only in the dispute resolution function. These parties are not interested in
rules created by the courts as they follow an immediate interest and do not always
have future stakes.65 The parties are interested even less in the clarification of existing
laws (education) function. While the state considers it a public good that increases the
utility of the society, private parties involved in the dispute have little interest in it. As
a result, the interest of the parties and the market will be directed only at the dispute
resolution function of the court.
With the intensification of competition, the nature of adjudication might change as
well. Competing states in the EU would offer their court adjudication in the market.
They would be receptive to the requests of the market and shape their adjudication
system accordingly. It is reasonable to think that competing countries would agree to
adjudicate as many disputes as possible and even disputes not strictly related to their
jurisdictions. This is also facilitated by Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation, which
allows parties to choose the courts of Member States before the conflict arises. By
doing this, states fictitiously consider these disputes as public goods in their own
jurisdiction, because they are interested only in the benefits related to attracting liti-
gation and not in the case itself. These disputes do not have any of the desired ele-
ments of public goods: they exclude the population of that state because they are
not related with that state and the consumption from the disputing parties completely
eliminates the population of that jurisdiction. Furthermore, ambitious jurisdictions
might offer privacy during adjudication and restrain the public from the courtrooms.
While this can be an appealing move for litigating parties, it is a drawback for the
public nature of hearings and access to records or publications. Another negative side
of this would be the creation of non-transparent precedents with repercussions in the
interpretation of law.
The rule creation element of adjudication might be affected by competition as well. So
far, rule creation from court decisions in continental Europe is not as important as it is
in England. Competition would mean that cases not related or faintly related to the
state would be accepted for adjudication as well. Rules that derive from those cases
might be difficult to be generalised for the countrywhere the case is being adjudicated
for two reasons. First, the applicable law might be that of a different country.66 Sec-
ondly, the interest involved does not relate to the interest of the population in that
Barry, ‘The Tyranny of Choice’ (2004) 290(4) Scientific American-American Edition 70; Schwartz, Barry,
‘Self-determination: The Tyranny of Freedom’ (2000) 55(1) American Psychologist 79.
65. Landes and Posner 1979, pp. 235, 260.
66. Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations and Rome II Regulation on the law
applicable to non-contractual obligations are the main instruments that designate the applicable law in
the EU.
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country. For these reasons, the state that organises adjudication might renounce the
rule creation function of court decisions. Thiswould lookmore democratic as it would
concentrate law making on the legislative body, but maybe not most suitable move.
The problem of non-transparent precedents (mentioned above) will undermine their
credibility and value.
The function of clarification of existing laws (education) might get its drawbacks from
the competition for adjudication as well. Since disputes attracted by competition con-
tain many foreign elements, they might not be appropriate to be used as education or
clarification of the local law. Clarification of law and contribution to the science of law
could then be rendered mostly or only by the academic world. Furthermore, educa-
tion and social standardisation can be achieved by other means and with different
approaches. The problem here will be that law’s development or its analysis will
be deprived from an important source of innovation and practice.
In other words, in a competitive environment adjudication risks becoming a form of
arbitration. States will put adjudication in a market and treat it as a private good.
Competing states will offer court adjudication to foreign parties only for dispute res-
olution and for cases that have little to do with their jurisdictions. This way two court
adjudication functions will be lost, while the dispute resolution functions (even
though regarded as a public good) will have fewer of the characteristics associated
with public goods. This situation would decrease the distinction between arbitration
and adjudication and would remove elements of adjudication that have been its
trademark for a long time.
. CONCLUS ION
The relation to a good is subjective.What is good for someone is not a good for another.
A good is a public goodwhen it is considered as such by a government authority regard-
less of the opinion of private parties. In general, governments try to give non-exclud-
able and non-rivalrous properties to public goods.
Adjudication is one of several dispute resolutionmechanisms in use inmany societies.
It involves, among others, the use of logic, state coercion and intervention, and a dis-
pute that is a public good. It has been considered as a public good by many govern-
ments because of its peculiarities. Adjudication has three functions that are
considered as public goods: a dispute resolution function, a rule creating function
and a clarification of existing laws (education) function.
There are signs of competition for adjudication in the EU. Countries have shown signs
of competition and are expected to be more aggressive because of the benefits related
to attracting cross-border litigants. An intensification of competition in the future can
 Evolution in Dispute Resolution
overwhelm the nature of court adjudication as a public good. Even though some of
the dispute resolution function of adjudication would be formally called public
goods, its nature would be private. Other elements of adjudication such as rule cre-
ation and education, and clarifying the existing law, can be detached from adjudica-
tion to make it more flexible and more manageable for competition purposes.
Competition of court adjudication can make adjudication look more like arbitration
and therefore more like a private good.
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